become. For a great many people now, when it comes to learning, it is no longer voluntary but obligatory. And there is now a deep sense of unease among educational practitioners about the ways in which educational purposes are increasingly subordinated to labour market objectives.
The rise of the concept of lifelong learning should be seen as a tool for the reform and modernization of education and training systems, says John Field, Professor of Lifelong Learning at the University of Stirling. As such it is just one aspect of a much wider transformation in the relationship between civil society and the state in the western nations. At the heart of the rise of the concept of lifelong learning lies the notion of individual attitudes and behaviour. In a 'learning society' where lifelong learning is supposedly the norm people are individually responsible for obtaining the information and training they require for their own wellbeing. The notion works as a powerful narrative frame that offers simultaneously both a justification for reducing public services and an encouragement to seek individual solutions to public issues. The trend towards lifelong learning thus shifts the burden of responsibility onto the individual at the same time as the welfare state in other areas of public life switches from 'passive' welfare support (in the form, say, of grants for students) to 'active' labour market policies. These latter policies favour up-skilling, re-training, and various active strategies to form individuals who need, desire and take responsibility for their own learning (see Field, 2000 Field, , 2001 .
Field presents evidence from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Learning Society Research Programme. This indicates that the general move towards lifelong learning, which looks as if it is increasing opportunities, also increases tendencies towards greater inequality. It both produces new sorts of inequalities and helps to entrench old ones. He cites four reasons for this: -Closure of options for those deemed unskilled, particularly young people entering the labour market for the first time, along with older male unemployed people -Rising general expectations amongst employers and citizens reflected in demand for higher levels of basic and 'key' skills such as I.T. competences, communications skills and team-working -The 'new politics of poverty', marked by a shift away from 'passive' welfare support to 'active' labour market policies -The ways in which non-participation in the new learning culture can become a marker that serves to legitimate unequal treatment and so help create inequalities which arise partly from widespread acceptance of the idea and practice of lifelong learning (Field, 2000) Since publication of Field's research in 2000, trends have continued along the same lines in the UK and elsewhere. Over the same period, the epistemological, cultural and fiscal tensions of higher education have led to the increasing incorporation of the academy into the world of corporate capital. In consequence, one of the most frequently repeated goals of official policy now is to make universities more responsive to the needs of the economy and more like commercial companies in governance. And whilst many more people now receive a higher education there still does not exist that 'educated public' about which the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre wrote two decades ago.
In 1985, Alasdair MacIntyre, expatriate Scot, and one of the world's most acclaimed living philosophers, delivered a lecture titled 'The idea of an educated public' in which he acknowledged his debt to the contemporary Scottish philosopher, George Elder Davie, and his reading of the Scottish Enlightenment. He recommended that all new university teachers should read Davie's work, particularly his book, The democratic intellect (Davie, 1961; see MacIntyre, 1987) . In this book, Davie charts the gradual extinction in the Scottish universities of a type of higher education which encouraged breadth of study and, through the compulsory study of philosophy, a concern with theory and ideas. In Davie's view the critical role of education can only properly be fulfilled through engagement with the wider community. Following Davie, MacIntyre believes that the greatest achievement of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment was the creation of an educated public that was united through a shared, broadly based philosophical education. Thinking, especially about first principles, was not to be restricted to an academic elite but to be the business of all those involved in public life. MacIntyre believes that the Scottish Enlightenment unified popular governance and intellectual activity because it created an educated public. However, in his view, this ambition is now dead. There are now too many different and incompatible modes of justification and conceptions of the good for there to be any foundation for such an educated public to exist.
Instead of providing models for public debate, academics now seldom encourage public minded attitudes and actions, even among themselves. The idea of an educated public which is at the heart of my book is based on the notion of collective responsibility. My book seeks to counter MacIntyre's pessimism regarding the possibility of an educated public and at the same time it refuses the inevitability of the commercialisation of education. The book's premise is that some of the principles by which an educated public could be achieved, and could exercise critical scrutiny of experts and of power, can be found in the tradition of enquiry which forms the central case studied in this book, that of the democratic intellect. However, the central argument of the book is that this needs to be informed by currents of more radical thought and practice from outside that tradition. The book is structured around a historical case study entitled 're-framing the democratic intellect', which, though based on longstanding Scottish university traditions, seeks to illuminate themes of contemporary interest and importance in the wider, international context.
The book seeks to re-frame the democratic intellect and its associated ideal of an educated public through a revaluation of these ideas in light of current issues facing universities worldwide. A central focus is the relationship between culture and economics, and between national myths and education. To repeat, certain stories, metaphors and 'myths' get fixed through repetition and they come to frame our perceptions of the world. Cultures are built on competition and rivalry and on what Freud refers to as the 'narcissism of minor differences' in Civilization and its discontents (Freud, 1975; and see Garber, 2001) . This is as true of national cultures and identities as it is of disciplinary and gendered ones. The democratic intellect is part of a national narrative that is, amongst other things, deeply gendered. Nationalist fantasies are almost always gendered fantasies. For this reason women have enormous historical potential not to be nationalists (see Modleski, 1998) .
A central facet of the democratic intellect tradition as explained to us by George Davie and others is captured by Alasdair MacIntyre when he writes, 'We flourish or fail to flourish, live or die, as our theses, arguments, and doctrines live or die' (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 201) . First, I propose that since life is not an argument, developing 'critical intelligence' in the sense delineated by the tradition of democratic intellectualism, whilst it matters, is not enough. At the same time, I agree with Eric Hobsbawm's sentiment: 'If critique is not enough, it is more essential than ever' (Hobsbawm, 2002, p. 277) . Second, I want to question the kind of intellectual history that treats life like an argument and which is summed up in the quotation from MacIntyre. This kind of 'philosophical' approach is especially appealing to those interested in tracing the development of their disciplines. Indeed, Davie tells us that he began writing The democratic intellect in the course of preparing a doctoral thesis on the Scottish philosophy of common sense.
A central limitation of such works of intellectual history is that the notion of contextualisation they favour almost always consists of depicting the discussions and quarrels amongst formally educated men. The historian, Eileen Yeo, summarises her challenge to this sort of history when she says: 'If scholars do not seek subaltern groups they do not find them. Without a more spacious idea of context which makes room for less privileged persons, scholars will go on constructing models of a scientific world and of the production of knowledge which allow no room for activity from below in the past or in the future' (Yeo, 1995, p. xi ; and see Chapter 6 below). Since many 'traditions' have been formed through various kinds of domination, exclusion and subordination I want to suggest that in turning to 'our' tradition of democratic intellectualism, we need to apply to it what has been called a 'hermeneutic of critical suspicion' to assess its capacity to include those not included when its terms were set and hence to assess whether it worth preserving (see Kearney, 2002) .
The 'force of example' is often underestimated. Yet case knowledge is central to human learning. In writing my book around a particular case, I have done so in ways which deal with different facets of the case, drawing on different disciplines, including sociology, education, political science, philosophy, history, English literature and, even, planning theory, for illumination. The particular value of the case-study lies in its capacity to reveal the contextual and interpenetrating nature of various forces. This means that whilst the book's main focus is higher and lifelong education, readers from different backgrounds may make different interpretations and draw different conclusions regarding what the democratic intellect case is a case of (see Flyvbjerg, 2001 ). Davie's book was ostensibly a description of the nineteenth century struggle over the future of University education in Scotland but it was also an intervention in a contemporary debate over university expansion, at a time when they were becoming less local and less Scottish. Similarly, when Davie turned to the eighteenth century in his A passion for ideas, interpreting the Scottish Enlightenment as an expression of Scotland's distinctive experience as a nation in the early modern period, he was addressing a public constituency infused with the resurgence of Scottish nationalism of the 1970s.
The current local/national context in which I write is one of disappointment, specifically, disappointment at the failure of the Scottish Parliament (inaugurated in 1999) to deliver on its promise to compensate for the so-called 'democratic deficit'. This was the main argument used in Scottish civil society for devolution. It reflected increasing talk of a democratic deficit throughout the Western democracies, a feeling of the irrelevance of traditional electoral politics to the lives of citizens, and concern about an erosion of civil liberties. Internationally, questions of citizenship are now pressing in an unprecedented way, both locally and globally. Significantly, a spate of books has been published for an international, especially North American, audience on the Scottish Enlightenment and the 'making of the modern world ' (Herman, 2002) ; on Enlightenment Edinburgh as 'capital of the mind' (Buchan, 2003) , and on 'why Scottish philosophy matters ' (Broadie, 2001 ).
An extreme example of the recent genre of popular history writing is Arthur Herman's celebratory and uncritical eulogy about Scottish-American relationships and the 'Scots' invention of the modern world'. The title of his book when published in Britain was The Scottish Enlightenment: The Scots' invention of the modern world. The American edition is titled How the Scots invented the modern world: The true story of how Western Europe's poorest nation created our world and everything in it. Herman's book (which became a bestseller) is notable not only for its uncritical analysis of that relationship (and for its failure to note that not all aspects of the Scots' contribution to the modern world were praiseworthy). It is notable also for its lack of any sense of the complex mix -of political, economic, ideological, religious and fiscal forces -which were involved in that making and within which the Scottish factor was just that, one factor (see Herman, 2004) . Moreover, the Scottish Enlightenment was itself only one part of a much wider movement (see especially Chapters 7 and 8 below).
Outside Scotland, the debate sparked off by Davie's book was more or less ignored. I suspect, too, that few in Scotland have read The democratic intellect from cover to cover, or its sequel, The crisis of the democratic intellect (1986) . This is true even of those who have gestured towards the idea in their own writing, including myself (see Barr, 1999) . Davie has the knack of choosing the good titles, ones which hold special appeal, particularly in Scotland. A passion for ideas is a great title, yet in reality it is a somewhat arcane set of re-printed essays on the Scottish Enlightenment and its heroes (Davie, 1994) . His titles strike a chord perhaps because, at best, they tune into something important and still alive which, if re-kindled, could be a source of revived thinking and practice concerning democracy (and not just in Scotland); at worst, because they pander to a specific faction of the Scottish intelligentsia who combine rather unpleasantly a 'wha's like us, gie few and they're a' deid' mentality with a stubborn sense of inferiority (always seeing Scotland in relation to the bigger neighbour, England).
At a time when many hail the exhaustion of modern sources of critique and propose postmodernist frames of reference, others seek to re-engage with pre-modern and pre-Enlightenment traditions of ethical, social and political thought. The latter frequently incorporate a critique of what is regarded as modernist optimism: against notions of progress and perfectibility, revisionists counterpose human fallibility, the hold of tradition and the need for constant vigilance against illusion. Variants of this approach sometimes take the form of a secular reassertion of Calvinist notions of original sin. And indeed a major reappraisal of Davie's work by Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull is written in just such terms (see Beveridge and Turnbull, 1989; see also 1997) . For myself, I see the wagging finger. My own point of departure remains the ideals of the Enlightenment. However, I sometimes draw on so-called 'anti-Enlightenment' thinkers (dubbed this by others, not by themselves) because of their capacity for thinking in fresh ways, especially about power.
In linking the Scottish tradition of the democratic intellect to Alasdair MacIntyre's idea of an educated public I argue that MacIntyre underestimates people and their capacities. The so-called 'incompatibility' of which he speaks (and the source of his cultural pessimism) does not stem from lived experience but from doctrine and from the 'tradition' by which he and Davie set such store (see Chapter 2). Hannah Arendt pointed out that tradition can be a threat to voices in the past, 'denying them the power to shake us' (Gaita, 1998, p. xxxiv) . Feminist educators, less inclined to appeal to 'lost' traditions, insist on the need for educational and pedagogical approaches which enable the articulation of 'views from below'. Such a project of articulation is not simply a matter of 'giving expression' or 'voice' to the experience of currently marginalised identities. It is also about 'opening up perspectives from which these may be renegotiated, transcended, even directly disowned', thereby increasing the possibilities of knowledge (Ryle and Soper, 2002, p. 85; see also Nelson, 1993; Barr, 2000) .
Characteristically, social movements such as those from which feminism has sprung (as a theory and practice of women's liberation) are 'thrown up' by the historical moment. Often, their object is emancipation from various kinds of repressive traditions from the past, as well as from prevailing orthodoxies. Often, too, their greatest struggle is to avoid being absorbed into the status quo (see Wain, 1995) . Feminist approaches thus stress the need for more democratic knowledgemaking projects and critique higher education for its failure to develop more inclusive and democratic strategies, specifically regarding gender, but also concerning class, race and ethnicity. Scholars like Cynthia Cockburn have provided new ways of 'thinking what we are doing' (to borrow Hannah Arendt's phrase) which draw insight and knowledge from popular action and community-based projects (Cockburn, 1999; Arendt, 1958) .
Iris Marion Young speaks of the need to work towards processes of 'deep democracy' in contrast with the superficial democracy which has been achieved by many countries (Young, 2000) . Similarly, I want to speak of 'deep education', as a necessary corollary to deep democracy. Young also proposes a notion of 'differentiated solidarity' which she explains as follows: 'Most uses of the term "solidarity" assume some sort of fellow feeling or mutual identification, as do its synonyms, such as "community". But in our complex and plural societies ideals of inclusion must rely on a concept of mutual respect and caring that presume distance: that norms of solidarity hold among strangers and those who in many ways remain strange to oneanother ' (ibid. p. 222) . The basis of such solidarity is simply that people live together -in a specific place or, more widely, in the same world -whether they like it or not.
Nevertheless, in approaching the book's project, I hesitate. A rhetoric of conviction and certainty (sometimes, even, of revelation and salvation) clothes much of the discourse of the democratic intellect. A litany of founding fathers inhabits it and there is accordingly much name dropping, name calling, point scoring, and replacing of one list of names for another as the real proponents of the Scottish democratic intellect. In both the pro and anti camps (heroes and villains) a fair dose of bad temper is expressed and much black and white thinking. At the very heart of the idea of the democratic intellect, it is claimed, lies the conviction that everyone has a voice; there is no place here for the distinction between expert and non-expert. Yet there is or can be in Scotland a hectoring, scolding tone to public debate, a tone that couples with a form of epistemological self-righteousness that suppresses debate by attacking or ignoring anyone who dares to step outside the cosy consensus. The novelist Andrew O'Hagan, who has been accused of suffering from the Scottish 'cringe' (resulting from 'inferiorism' in relation to the bigger neighbour, England) has commented: 'A people so committed to the idea of belonging must surely live in fear of strangers [especially of] the stranger in themselves' (O'Hagan, 2002, p. 12) . In deciding to focus on the democratic intellect as the central case examined in my book, I have chosen to weave O'Hagan's imagery into the title of my book.
I do not concentrate on the merits or demerits of Davie's argument or the historical accuracy of his book(s) so much as on how through repetition (arguments for and against) The democratic intellect has set the terms of a major area of debate around educational curricula in Scotland, framing discussion in a way which screens out other, and in my view more productive and interesting, areas of enquiry. This pattern is a familiar one and it is not of course peculiar to Scotland. In this respect, the concept of the democratic intellect is analogous to that currently ubiquitous topic of discussion, 'social capital', a concept that as currently employed, often interchangeably with 'civil society' (construed as a space between the market and the state) is remarkably anodyne and neutral, especially regarding issues of power and conflict. The World Bank has adopted the idea, thus giving the social capital enterprise considerable momentum.
Unlike investigative categories such as patriarchy and racism -currently unfashionable -the notion of social capital does little to direct attention to deep structures of inequality and disadvantage. It is self-help and cooperation, raised from the individual to the communal level on one hand, and on the other hand, it is the rich and powerful speculating how to improve the lot of the poor by promoting self-help and organisation without questioning the source of their economic disadvantage. It imagines itself to be participatory and democratic but is 'primarily participation from below imposed from above'. Like bad money, says Ben Fine, it will drive more appropriate ideas and theory out of circulation, paving the way for its own and economics' colonisation of social theory (see Fine, 2000, p. 199-200) .
Some of the blindspots of Davie's central text are fairly well marked. R.D. Anderson has documented those in relation to access and equal opportunity (see Anderson, 1989) . Others such as Cairns Craig have critiqued its structure of heroic past versus failed present (Craig, 2001) . Some, too, have questioned the central role allocated to Scotland's Presbyterianism heritage within it (see especially Brown, 1997) . And there has even been the occasional side-swipe by feminists for its silence on women (see Anderson and Norquay, 1984) . On this last point, it is notable that notions of community and relationship, as well as common sense, democracy and 'sympathy', have been central to 'the' Scottish philosophical tradition. John Macmurray, a relatively unacknowledged philosopher when he was writing in the 1950s (at least amongst professional philosophers) goes so far as to use the mother-child relationship as a central axis of his philosophy (see especially, Macmurray, 1957; 1961 ; and see Chapter 4 below). Why, then, have women played so little part in the whole debate, given that they have been allotted responsibility for nurturance, sympathetic understanding, 'community' and relationships by 'our' culture?
I do not want to pick apart Davie's text over four decades on from when it was published. The thesis has been too influential to be so easily dismissed. But I do believe that too many of us recite the notion of democratic intellect without much thought. I have used it myself as a kind of rallying cry for democratising learning and education (see Barr, 1999) . It has been said that a revaluation of a canon is as significant as its elaboration or disruption (Foster, 2001 ). That is the task I have set myself. We need new narratives of the democratic intellect which complicate its past and, perhaps, support its future. To sum up, the book is less a critique of Davie and his followers (although it is this in part) than it is an effort to begin to shift the focus of attention about democracy in education away from the well-trodden paths signposted by Davie and picked up by MacIntyre. In terms of a central metaphor of the book, this is to insist that 'frames' and images hold us captive in even more powerful ways than arguments. In terms of the image contained in the title of the book, it is to claim that if we are to have an educated public worth fighting for, the emphasis on belonging which is central to MacIntyre's idea needs to give way to the needs of strangers.
The book falls into three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1-3) outlines the book's aims, critiques and proposes an alternative to Alasdair MacIntyre's idea of an educated public, and explores an area of educational practice which could inspire a reinvigorated, more expansive idea of 'an' educated public. Part 2 (Chapters 4-9) consists of an extended case study of the democratic intellect, examined from the point of view of class, sex and Empire. Part 3 (Chapters 10-12) builds on the case study to propose a notion of the democratic intellect and educated public based on notions of social equity, diversity, praxis and embodied knowledge. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, prior to anyone 'appropriating' a word or text (such as the 'democratic intellect') the word 'does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language…but rather…in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions; it is from these that one must take the word, and make it one's own' (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 293-4) . Before beginning the process of re-framing the democratic intellect, commencing with a discussion of its associated ideal of an educated public, I offer a few snapshots or perspectives on it:
WHAT IS THE DEMOCRATIC INTELLECT? '[T]he "democratic intellect" does not mean the democratization of education as this is usually understood socially and politically…[It is] a philosophical training for the elite…little concerned with broadening the popular base of education' (R.D. Anderson, quoted in Walker, 1994, p. 176) .
'Every English person knows that Scottish education is immeasurably superior, and every English person, according to the latest Europe-wide research, is probably wrong ' (Marr, 1992, p. 47) .
'Davie underestimated the practical domination of the universities by the clergy, lawyers and medical men; ignored the superficial instruction of huge lectures and the intellectual conservatism of the country in the age of "vital religion"' (Harvie, 1977, p. 207) .
'Scottish education was characterised by very extreme authoritarian attitudes, middle-class elitism towards working-class people, and an arid "intellectualism" that refused to acknowledge any of the distinctive features of Scottish culture, literature or radicalism.. ' (Young, 1996, p. 259) .
'A people [the Scots] who are, perhaps, the acutest reasoners in Europe, if you concede to them the principles from which they reason, but who, on the other hand…will accept them on almost any evidence,…and are very logical' (Buckle, 1861, p. 361) 'The most empirical nation [England] in Europe; a nation utterly abhorring first principles, priding itself on its common sense, proclaiming the superiority of facts over ideas…despising everything unless some direct and immediate benefit could be expected to accrue from it' (ibid. p. 361).
' [W] hat the modern world has realised are the worst fears of the Scottish Enlightenment rather than its best hopes…Instead of that ever widening educated public of the democratic intellect, which were the intended beneficiaries of those who understood the distinctive merits of the Scottish Universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries -George Elder Davie has written their history in The Democratic Intellect and The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect, two books which should be compulsory reading for every newly appointed university teacher in Britain -we have the mass semiliteracy of television audiences' (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 272) .
'Academic curricula are male constructs and females are still largely defined out…All books on the democratic intellect do this; all' (Bown, 1996, p. 182) .
'The Democratic Intellect is the 'single most important volume written in the twentieth century about Scottish intellectual history ' (Turnbull, 2003) .
THE IDEA OF AN EDUCATED PUBLIC

INTRODUCTION
In 1985 Alasdair MacIntyre delivered a lecture called The idea of an educated public in which he argued that educators needed to bring back the idea of an 'educated public' from the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and to regard public education as education into such a public. MacIntyre claimed that the primary achievement of the Scottish Enlightenment was the creation of an educated public rather than a coterie of academic specialists: by placing a heavy burden on collective rational activity the Scottish Enlightenment fostered the belief in widespread social agreement upon standards and the subject matter for which thinking is required. Thinking, especially about first principles, should not be restricted to an elite of academics but should be a fundamental activity of all those involved in public life. MacIntyre regrets that in modern society thinking has become a professionalized activity, available only in specialized contents and disciplines.
MacIntyre's arguments echo with the theme of a conference held in London on the public role of intellectuals a few years ago. Defined in an accompanying article in the U.K's Guardian newspaper as primarily those 'men and women who are in the business of developing ideas', the claim is that intellectuals as a group are on the defensive, held in contempt by a public from whom the intellectual is deeply estranged (Furedi, 2003, p. 16) . Increasingly, intellectuals direct their writing at other experts in their field and, particularly in the academy, their work is more and more self-referential, jargon-ridden and incomprehensible to all but an inner circle. Few spaces exist to encourage public conversation about the key issues of the day. 'Quick fix' efforts like postal ballots and internet-voting only serve to legitimize the current state of public disengagement, doing nothing to promote the kind of regular reflection, conceptual effort and public debate required for real participation. The immediate question, writes Furedi, is whether or not intellectuals are prepared to cultivate a public for their ideas: 'The real issue is not whether or not academics have a public role to play. The question is whether they have a public to interact with. And that to a considerable extent depends on how seriously they take the public and how seriously they take ideas' (Furedi, 2003, p. 16) .
Invoking the Enlightenment, Furedi suggests that the notion that ideas are dangerous, associated in the past with the Right, is now also advanced by postmodernist and left-wing critics of the Enlightenment, weary of big ideas and failed social experiments. He believes that it is through a dialogue between intellectuals and the wider public that the ideas that matter develop. I agree. Nevertheless, there is a certain arrogance in the one-way conception of the relation between 'intellectuals' and 'the public' which he promotes, as there is in the central pivot of the argument: intellectuals versus the rest. It is certainly the case that, once seen as an age of reason, tolerance and emancipation, the Enlightenment is now routinely characterised as repressive and incipiently totalitarian, its logic one of control and domination rather than liberation. The question asked by Enlightenment philosophers, 'What is it to be human?' has been replaced by 'What is it that makes us different?' Critics argue that the Enlightenment theme of common humanity and the common good has historically functioned to suppress and conceal exploited minorities and those of a different culture, race, gender, age or ability (Guha and Spivak, 1988) . This indictment has in turn come under fire from Enlightenment champions such as the late Roy Porter (Porter, 2001) .
In this chapter (and throughout the book) I want to reconnect with the notion of a common, shared world that was central to Enlightenment thought. Like MacIntyre I focus on education, especially higher and adult education and I do so in relation to aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment which, though not peculiar to it, gave it a distinctive cast. However, I reconceptualise the notion of an educated public in a way which reconnects it with features of the Scottish Enlightenment which are not brought into focus in MacIntyre's narrative. In addition, my re-framing goes against the grain of Furedi's story of a caste of intellectuals alienated from the public. It develops as well as departs from ideas touched on in earlier publications (Barr and Steele, 2003; Taylor, Barr and Steele, 2002) . And its guiding image is that of the title of the book, the stranger within.
AN OTHER ENLIGHTENMENT
The Scottish Enlightenment emphasised sentiment, emotion and imagination as well as reason. David Hume, a key Scottish Enlightenment figure, believed that 'reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions'. Adam Smith, close friend of Hume and another key Scottish Enlightenment figure, was allergic to anything that smacked of imposed enlightenment -anything akin to the George W. Bush approach to international relations, we might say. Like all Enlighteners, Smith and Hume believed in the progress of civilization through the growth of knowledge but were less confident perhaps than the French and English that it necessarily led to improvement. They also attached less weight to reason, aware of the 'stickiness' of institutions and the force of habit and custom in shaping behaviour. And whereas in France, the Enlightenment tended to be anti-religion, this was not so in Scotland (or England) where it has been dubbed a 'Godly Enlightenment' (Porter, 2001 ). Most significantly, in Scotland, unlike elsewhere (particularly England and France) the universities were absolutely central to the Enlightenment. 1 This is acknowledged by Alasdair MacIntyre whose argument concerning the particular importance of the Scottish universities in creating a new kind of education based on Enlightenment precepts -and an educated public -is indebted to George Elder Davie's The democratic intellect (1961) .
In Davie's narrative of the democratic intellect the main distinction of Scottish higher education was the central place accorded to philosophy within a broader course of general education. He contrasts this with higher education in England which was more specialised. This emphasis on philosophy coloured the approach of professors of other subjects like maths, science or literature, in their attention to first principles. MacIntyre suggests that there were three necessary conditions for this new public to exist. Firstly, there had to be a tolerably large body of individuals, 'educated into both the habit and the opportunity of active rational debate' who understand the questions at issue as being important for their shared social existence, and recognise each other as constituting a public, not merely a group of specialists (MacIntyre, 1987, p. 18) . Secondly, there had to be agreement as to the standards of appeal by which arguments may be judged, which was quite distinct from appeal to the authority of custom and local precedent. A third condition was that there should exist, to a large degree, a shared background of beliefs and attitudes informed by reading a common body of texts 'which are accorded a canonical status', not as a final court of appeal but such as are treated with a special seriousness in the context of 'an established tradition of interpretative understanding of how such texts should be read and construed ' (ibid. p. 19) .
Moral philosophy was the keystone of the university curriculum. Indeed, MacIntyre claims that 'the rise and fall of Reid's and Stewart's philosophy of common sense provided the philosophical debates with their central focus [and] the rise and fall of the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment was coincident with the rise and fall of that philosophy. This coincidence suggests strongly that the existence of an educated public requires a widespread shared philosophical education' (ibid. p. 22). What held the curriculum together for the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment was thus a certain intellectual continuity between moral philosophy and other forms of enquiry which were also taught 'philosophically' by the other professors. This owed itself to a common understanding of the intellectual enterprise and of philosophical enquiry, as essentially deductive, proceeding from first principles that are established by 'common sense'. Caution is required so as not to collapse the idea or ideal of the eighteenth century Scottish university as portrayed by MacIntyre and Davie and its actual history. Ideas do not inhabit an airy realm above it all. A specific interest of this chapter is how certain ideas are taken up, exported and read (and sometimes popularized) in different times and places, according to the 'mood of the times' (see Le Doeuff, 1991) .
I shall argue that MacIntyre is unconsciously heir to a particular reading of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment, one which is actually rooted in a nineteenth century cultural context (and project) and which nonetheless still defines much debate today. His narrative (like Davie's) has indeed been contested on historical grounds, especially for overstating the size and role of the educated public. It is clear that the peculiarity of the Scottish 'educated public' of the early eighteenth century was its small scale, its local nature and its restricted social composition: mainly clergy, lawyers, merchants, schoolmasters of the better off schools, and members of the (mainly) lesser gentry. And all were, of course, men.
In an interview with MacIntyre a few years ago he claimed that what we confront now in 'advanced societies', in stark contrast to the hopes of the Scottish Enlightenment for an 'ever widening educated public of the democratic intellect', is the conjunction of 'an excluded and dependent cultural proletariat with a set of overlapping elites who control the presentation of political choice, the manipulation of economic organization, the legal structures and the flow of information' (Knight, 1998, p. 272) . What the modern world has realized, he maintains, are the 'worst fears of the Scottish Enlightenment rather than its best hopes... Instead of that ever widening educated public of the democratic intellect, who were the intended beneficiaries of those who understood the distinctive merits of the Scottish universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries … we have the mass semi literacy of television audiences' (ibid. p. 272). The demise of the educated public represents for MacIntyre the situation of modernity: 'We possess in our culture too many different and incompatible modes of justification. We do not even have enough agreement to be able to arrive at a common mind about what it is we should be quarrelling about' (MacIntyre, 1987, p. 6 ).
MacIntyre's pessimism regarding the contemporary possibility of forming such a public is clear. For him the concept of an educated public is at best the ghost haunting our educational systems, one which cannot be exorcised:
Our inheritance from the culture of the Enlightenment is so pervasive that we cannot rid ourselves of attitudes to the arts and sciences which presuppose that the introduction into membership of an educated public of at least some of our pupils is one of the central aims of our educational systems. But, so we have claimed, there is no such public for them to be a member of (ibid. p. 34).
It has been suggested that Three rival versions of moral enquiry is MacIntyre's attempt to exorcise the ghost, at least in his own mind (MacIntyre, 1990) . A key factor of the Scottish educated public as MacIntyre describes it was the role played by the universities and the professors in the coming into being and continued existence of this public. Now, as then, he suggests, maybe the answer is similar, namely, in reconceptualising the universities as cultural and intellectual foci for contemporary educated publics but within the pragmatic reality of an irremediably pluralistic world. Different educated publics could grow around different universities representing different contesting moralities and cultures. He presents us with a scenario of rival universities set up according to theoretical and doctrinal allegiance, 'each advancing its own enquiries in its own terms and each securing the type of agreement necessary to ensure the progress and flourishing of its enquiries by its own sets of exclusions and prohibitions, formal and informal' while at the same time institutionalizing fora for debate between universities, hence between rival standpoints (Wain, 1995, p. 116) .
The model of a university 'advancing its own enquiries in its own terms' is not entirely fanciful; it typifies Catholic universities which are quite common throughout Europe. The implication of MacIntyre's position, then, is that a Catholic university should exclude non-Catholics, a Marxist one, non-Marxists, and so on. For the Thomist Christian that MacIntyre is, we must become a certain kind of person before we can read aright: 'we have to learn from authoritative traditions how to sift and evaluate ourselves' (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 102) . What should we make of this scenario of a society composed of different competing educated publics growing around ideologically exclusive universities, each advancing enquiry from one particular point of view, operating under conditions of constrained disagreement and controlled dissent (ibid. especially p. 230-1)? Clearly, observes Kenneth Wain, MacIntyre favours only a very controlled sort of plurality. He recognises that his educated public, organised around fixed competing orthodoxies backed by tradition, would have restricted membership, much like the Scottish Enlightenment educated public, organized in and through 'institutionalized means, clubs and societies, periodicals and more formal educational institutions' (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 197) . MacIntyre gives no indication as to the relationship between this educated public and the wider community (Wain, 1995) .
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
It is significant that MacIntyre makes no mention of John Dewey or Jurgen Habermas, both of whom would reject such exclusivity in principle. According to Dewey it is the act of 'living together' that educates; education in this sense is assured by unrestricted communication, by plurality itself (Dewey, 1916, p. 6) . Habermas too pins his hopes on what he calls the 'lifeworld'; his publics come into being spontaneously, generated from tensions within the lifeworld where they tend to appear as social movements of different kinds (see Habermas, 1989) . Their purpose is not to perpetuate some orthodoxy or tradition; often, they have no traditions, no past to draw on, because they are 'thrown up' by the historical moment. Often, too, their object is liberation from prevailing traditions or orthodoxies, the Women's Liberation Movement being a case in point. MacIntyre makes no mention of social movements. Crucially, democratic social movements try to resist the terms of discussion and engagement which the status quo imposes.
Importantly, their arenas of practice are primarily political rather than intellectual; they employ politically infused, passionate modes of expression and contestation and sometimes their greatest struggle is to avoid being absorbed into the status quo (see Wain, 1995) . Thus radical adult educators like Stephen Brookfield locate the most valuable adult education within social movements, refusing the liberal vision of rational people engaging in democratic dialogue which dominates the field. Ordinary people striving to redress inequalities of power and life chances cannot afford to 'engage with' others on the basis of the mutual contestability of their positions; nor can they allow the notion of contestable differences to replace commitment to equality and justice (see Brookfield, 2005a and 2005b) . MacIntyre provides a rationale for educational resignation on the grounds that widespread intelligent public discussion is no longer possible. Is his pessimism justified? Is the idea presented in Three rival versions of moral enquiry worth pursuing? Or are we fated to a society where the most important matters must be left to experts, themselves limited by their own disciplinary training? Are these really our only alternatives? I do not believe so.
Plurality of belief and conflict between points of view do not make impossible the existence of an educated public, as MacIntyre seems to think. They do however imply a concept of a public which is open-textured and fluid, and which allows for a willingness to grapple with questions of right and wrong within the context of others with different beliefs. Arguably, without diversity and immanent conflict we can only perpetuate existing traditions; we cannot create new ones (see Feinberg, 1991) . In an age of supposed liberal-democratic consensus and neo-liberalism, it is not democratic aspiration 'from below' that reigns but, in Perry Anderson's words, 'the asphyxiation of public and political difference by capital above' (Anderson, 2000, p. 16) . Politically, few demands are made in terms of democratic participation, with the 'citizen-spectator' replacing more active notions of citizenship (Wolin, 2002) . In such a world there is an urgent need for a reinvigoration of democratic contestation. Starting from everyday life rather than from doctrinal tradition, it is clear that one of the most pressing questions of our time is how to live in a world with conflicting values. From this point of view, the most important choices facing us are not about theories or doctrines at all, but about our practical dealings with one another (see Mendus, 1992) .
Believers in democracy who think that MacIntyre's call for a return to the notion of a public (more specifically, an educated public) is essentially on the right track need to look elsewhere for inspiration than his restricted model of controlled dissent. The Dewey/Habermas democratic tradition is one such 'elsewhere'. Another place from which to start is that strong adult education tradition (albeit a minority position in the history of adult education theory and practice) which is committed to the collective creation of knowledge, where community-based and 'dialogically inclined' groups of activists and citizens work collaboratively to examine their experiences, with a view to transforming society in democratic directions (Brookfield, 2005a and 2005b; see also Newman, 2006) . Features of the Scottish Enlightenment which are ignored by MacIntyre (in his emphasis on the necessity of sharing common texts) may be another source of inspiration. It is to these that I now turn. Before doing so, I want to indicate the direction of my argument.
MacIntyre appears to believe that there is no chance of people from different backgrounds and traditions reaching a reasoned agreement on moral (and indeed other) issues. Stephen Toulmin offers a telling example against this position: The National Commission for the Protection of Human Research Subjects took testimony from many people and drew up practical proposals on which all agreed. The commissioners then went home to write accounts of why they accepted the recommendations. This time there was no agreement. The explanation for this discrepancy is simple, says Toulmin: They could not agree on the reasons they concurred with the recommendations; their moral perceptions coincided but the reasons they gave depended on their backgrounds. This outcome is one for which MacIntyre cannot account. For him practical solutions to moral questions are 'applications' of wider systems of belief embodied in one's tradition's code. If the National Commission had followed this course there would have been deadlock rather than consensus. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Sceptics would have felt obliged to take stands on different systems of doctrine (Toulmin, 2001, p. 206) .
Related to this, it is arguably the case that the power of the great philosophical theories of the twentieth century (such as Marxism, pragmatism, positivism and existentialism) lay not in the truth of their doctrines but in the ability of their 'jargon' to get people from different walks of life to engage in projects of mutual interest. They had significance as social movements (not just systems of ideas) because of the several registers in which each could be articulated in various places and contexts, such as education, political science, psychiatry, communication studies, literary criticism, and, even, the general reading public. The point to underline here is that agreement on values, meanings and beliefs is not necessary for coordinated action (see Fuller and Collier, 2004) . In contrast, MacIntyre believes that 'We flourish or fail to flourish, live or die, as our theses, arguments and doctrines live or die' (MacIntyre 1990, p. 201) . Life, though, is not an argument, as the Scottish Enlightenment's greatest philosophers, David Hume and Adam Smith, stressed. It is to Hume and Smith that I now turn so as to highlight features of the Scottish Enlightenment that are elided by MacIntyre.
LIFE IS NOT AN ARGUMENT
A typical textbook on the Enlightenment will say that the Enlightenment rejected superstition, extolled reason as the means to improve life on earth, believed in control of the passions by rational thought and in replacing despotic rule by reasonable government. Such a textbook will often forget to say that the prevalent eighteenth century concept of reason did not see it as the opposite of emotion (or feeling, passion, imagination) but the opposite of prejudice. Recent scholarship suggests the need to qualify the Age of Reason as also the Age of Sentiment (Oz-Salzberger, 2001 ). Scottish Enlighteners especially (pre-eminently David Hume and Adam Smith) sought to incorporate the concept of sentiment into their philosophy of reason. For them, sentiment was a mainstay of modernity, such that being modern for Hume and Smith is in part a matter of emotional literacy. They believed that rational self-interest works well alongside a desire to do some good to others and, too, that reason and emotion have to go hand in glove in the market.
Sentiment is conducive to reasonableness in this scheme of things. Neither the market nor the polity can work, in their view, without a basic mutual sympathy and politeness between participants. This means that being reasonable, according to Smith and other writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, was partly a matter of being sentimental -not of the tear-jerking, silly type who is the object of Mary Wollstonecraft's scorn (see Chapter 8 below) but of the friendly type who knows about other human beings and can call on the 'impartial spectator' inside to make judgments about their feelings and decisions. Being modern for these Scots is a matter of emotional and moral progress, according to the literary scholar, Fania Oz-Salzberger, whose depiction of the Enlightenment is very far indeed from the bastion of pure reason that is often portrayed in textbooks. This Enlightenment is 'a Philosophic adventurer and trespasser, not to say cross-dresser' (Oz-Salzberger, 2001, p. 7). It is a hybrid, a mixer of reason and emotion, and it led in many directions that could not have been foreseen by the Scottish thinkers.
MacIntyre underestimates the importance of non-cognitive (in any narrow sense) factors and the willingness of people to go on talking despite fundamental disagreement. This is because the so-called 'incompatibility' which bothers him so much does not stem from experience so much as from doctrine. According to David Hume and Adam Smith, in contrast, it is experience rather than knowledge or shared doctrine that matters: habit and slow education by means of social experiences are crucial. Related to this, Michele Le Doeuff believes in turning customary forms of education on their head. In her view, if you want your children to be just, to themselves and to everyone else, you must go and live in a just city. Concerning ourselves primarily with the adult world, as this entails, 'replaces educationalist pedagogy with pedagogy through politics' (Le Doeuff, 1991, p. 300) .
I think that this idea encapsulates the 'disposition of enlightenment' as described by Emma Rothschild in a recent reappraisal of Adam Smith. Smith, who was greatly influenced by French Enlightenment beliefs, was critical of all religious establishments as well as of war, poverty and the privileges of the rich. He was in favour of the widest possible public discussion. However, this aspect of Smith's thought was lost after his death, largely because of the writings of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century philosopher and propagandist of the Scottish Enlightenment and of Scottish 'philosophy of common sense', Dugald Stewart (Rothschild, 2001; see also Wood, 2000) . It was Stewart who put Adam Smith on the intellectual map. In so doing he presented a de-radicalised version of Smith to the world. It may be for this reason that it is a little known fact that Smith supported (and his writings inspired) the revolutionary project of public adult education of 1788 and 1791 revolutionary France. This was not political or citizenship education per se, but, rather, that unrestricted 'universal public discussion among thoughtful, reflecting, self-respecting individuals', the prospect of 'political discussion among the multitude' which, in Rothschild's words, Dugald Stewart was 'obliged to repudiate in England in 1794'. He did so because of fears of revolution caused by recent revolutionary events in France (Rothschild, 2001, p. 98) . Smith was 'rediscovered' at the end of the eighteenth/beginning of the nineteenth century as a theorist of established institutions.
THE APOSTLE OF THE EXPERT
Stewart is a pivotal figure in my narrative. Dubbed the 'apostle of the expert', he was to become the philosopher of a new theory of citizenship which substituted the ideal of the virtuous expert for that of the virtuous citizen. Stewart's interest was to have a class of public servants who were sufficiently virtuous and wise to preserve commercial society. For him, the answer lay in the 'culture of the mind' and in creating an elite versed in the true principles of human understanding: the sort of wisdom which required the learning of metaphysics and was thus not accessible to the 'vulgar or ignorant ' (Phillipson, 1981, p. 38-9) . He also popularized Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense. As a result of Stewart's writings, what came to be called 'Scottish philosophy' in the nineteenth century was not the broad, normative moral philosophy of Hutcheson, the eighteenth century philosopher, but the 'highly analytical study of psychology, epistemology and metaphysics associated with Reid and Stewart' (Sher, 1985, p. 313-314; see Chapter 5 below; see also Wood, 2000) . Dugald Stewart's disciples started the Edinburgh Review in 1802 and spelled out a new role for public intellectuals. The journal's project was modernisation, enlightened public opinion and rule by experts. It was anti-radical and pro-reform. Popular education guided by an intellectual elite would, it was hoped, eradicate independent sources of popular knowledge and replace them with instrumental ones like the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (see Benchimol, 2002 ; see also Chapter 7 below). Later in the nineteenth century, Samuel Coleridge, Thomas Carlyle, John Henry Newman, Matthew Arnold and others of the group known as theorists of the clerisy, were to propose the cultivation of inner perfection through education as part of a project that was to transform social and political conflict into a struggle for personal development. Ben Knights puts the point more strongly: social transformation was to be achieved by cultural criticism by the elite (see Knights, 1978) . This notion was to animate critics from Matthew Arnold in the nineteenth century to F.R. Leavis and T.S. Eliot (high priests of New Criticism) in the twentieth century.
In relation to this it is instructive to reflect on the imperial claims made on behalf of literary criticism in the middle years of the twentieth century. By the 1950s, 'English' staked a claim to be considered a kind of 'presiding discipline' in the increasingly specialized universities and the literary critic figured as the model of the modern general intellectual (Collini, 2008, p. 258) . A central notion of the New Criticism was that 'great' literary work embodies maximum complexity and 'tension', with complexity of form, use of irony and multiple meanings particularly prized. John Guillory has argued that the ideological efficacy of the New Criticism did not rest in the politically and culturally conservative views of the individual critics but in their promotion of the idea of 'complex form' per se as a challenge to the dominant instrumental (scientific) culture. The New Critics could also exploit the cultural capital of 'difficulty' (made newly powerful, and a sign of distinction by Modernism) to fend off challenges from middlebrow culture (Guillory, 1993 ; see also Chapter 9 below).
The idea of the clerisy, that is, of intellectuals as a distinct and socially beneficial group, was an active one in the twentieth century. Nowadays somewhat tarnished, it nonetheless continues to be resurrected from time to time in some form or another. In parallel with its development, what has been called the seductive idea of the idea of a university was born (Rothblatt, 1989) . John Henry Newman's The idea of the university (1889) is probably the single most influential book on universities in the English language. In his book, Newman applies a method devised by Coleridge and influenced by Kant, which asks of an institution: What is its meaning? This idea has been seductive and lasting in relation to universities, believes Sheldon Rothblatt, the distinguished American historian of higher education but what has lasted is not any particular idea of a university. What has lasted is precisely 'the seductive idea of the idea of a university' and the habit of looking at institutions as if they embodied an idea (Rothblatt, 1989, p. 6) . The belief that universities possess a core idea or historical purpose has remained a constant part of the process of institutional self-evaluation and been the source of countless books bemoaning the 'loss' or 'betrayal' of that essential purpose ever since. Newman's particular idea of a university was of course that of the English university, as embodied in the Oxford University of his day (see especially Chapter 6 below).
EXPERT VERSUS ORDINARY REASON
It is significant that the history of the clerisy parallels that of the idea of a university. (The term is routinely expressed in italics but hereafter I shall drop this mode.) Intellectuals and 'men of letters' came to see themselves as the true legislators of the world -a project which is the antithesis of Smith's views which inspired the revolutionary project of adult education in revolutionary France to which I referred above -'learning the art of instructing oneself', in Condorcet's words. Smith thought the foundation of politics was to be found, like that of moral judgment, in the sentiments of millions of individuals, in their disposition to civilized political discussion, rather than in 'civic virtue', or the specifically political qualities of men in public settings. Everyone is alike in having the disposition to think oneself into the feelings of others. For him, the recognition of others as being like oneself is the core of a universal sense of justice and this is also the basis of one's judgments of other societies. Jacqueline Rose observes that all the evidence suggests that people do not kill if they can imagine themselves in the other person's shoes (Rose, 2003, p. 234) .
Adam Smith was a student of Francis Hutcheson, the great Irish philosopher, at Glasgow University. Hutcheson's notion of disinterestedness means trying to feel your way imaginatively into the experience of another, a kind of fellow feeling. 4 Imagination is enabled through education in the widest sense, according to Smith, who also opposed all forms of corporatism. Corporations like other restricted institutions are societies held together, not by shared rules, but by a common spirit, in Smith's view. He saw them as insensible to outsiders and as resulting in those with least power doing least well: 'Our spinners are poor people, women commonly, scattered about…without support or protection' (Smith, 1976, p. 134) . He was acutely aware of the insiderness and outsiderness of the many associations of civil society, and his plan for universal education was one whereby children did not learn subordination or the corporate spirit and in which there is no catechism, no prescription of belief and no training in virtue or citizenship. Instead, they learn through projects to have many ideas which jostle for interest. Education in this sense, libertarian education, is a good in itself for Smith. It also makes people 'more disposed to examine and more capable of seeing through ' political projects (ibid. p. 788) .
This implies that if we want to build an ethics of solidarity, we should reject the model of local groupings comprised of individuals whose interests are identical. Such a model creates what Michele Le Doeuff calls 'preferential circuits of solidarity' which soon become closed, leaving non-members in a limbo of indifference and coldness -a constant feature for two centuries in relation to minorities in democracies. This indifference and coldness finds not a remedy but a cause in corporations, religions and castes, 'including "the American white race"' (Le Doeuff, 1991, p. 313) . 5 Smith and Hume had confidence in people to feel an increase in humanity simply from the habit of conversing together. Today, this may seem naïve. However, the idea of a universal 'disposition of enlightenment', that is, of a disputatious, discursive, reflective theorizing way of life, which is also a way of life for everyone, was quite new in the eighteenth century. Such a disposition can be obstructed by prejudice or ignorance (just as the child's feelings of pity, via sympathy, can be distorted by cruel custom). It can also be set free but it isn't something in which people can be instructed. We cannot be educated to be enlightened.
Importantly, it is the ordinary reason of individuals that is the object of esteem for Hume and Smith. Correspondingly, Smith's anecdotes about those prone to self-interested behaviour are directed against the great and good, not the hoi polloi, and in his books these are parish worthies, dukes, university teachers and clergy, in the main. For Hume and Smith the great evil is the division of labour and resulting psychological boredom, inequality and uniformity. These are preventable by universal education, including the study of science and philosophy, that is, many ideas. Hence, too, Smith's emphasis on adult learning and the development of common sense, developing over many years, and the opposition to the notion of intellectuals as a caste apart. 6 An educated public does not imply democracy but democracy is enriched by an educated public. This is because the more people with a disposition to debate and discuss and who can accept the reality of difference, the deeper the democracy. Iris Marion Young speaks of the need to work towards processes of 'deep democracy' in contrast with the superficial democracy that has been achieved by many countries (Young, 2000) . Picking up on the notion of social experience and what I am calling 'slow education' (as in 'slow food') which I see implicit in Smith, perhaps we might speak of 'deep education' (or learning) as a necessary corollary of deep democracy. The alternative view to MacIntyre's is, then, that there are many sites and locations where publics could be created, but the disposition to engage in public debate and discussion is attenuated. Democracy as a way of life is a political process. It is the movement of democratization, says Simon Critchley, and democratization consists precisely in the 'manifestation of dissensus', rather than consensus (Critchley, 2007, p. 130) .
RE-IMAGINING THE HUMAN
For many Enlightenment philosophers reason was seen as a defining power of human beings. Yet from within the Enlightenment, notably the Scottish Enlightenment, came critique and suspicion of rationality as a disembodying process. There also came a stress on other human traits such as feeling and imagination, sympathy and sensibility, touch and sight. Feminists especially share this suspicion of 'cool' reason, yet few recognise the roots of this suspicion within the Enlightenment itself. Barbara Taylor believes that a kind of 'Whig anti-history' has emerged, where instead of looking back to the origins of the good we see the origins of that which we dislike and criticize, projecting back in time our present discontents (Taylor 1999). We do not have to accept the fashionable demonising of the Enlightenment to acknowledge that there can be no return to reason alone.
7 Hal Foster takes issue with critics of modernism and postmodernism who harbour a lost ideal (often not quite consciously) against which the 'bad object' of the present is judged (Foster, 2001) .
If, then, some notion of an 'educated public' (or publics) is still desirable, it needs to be decided how this can be achieved in the context of large scale economies, mass populations differentiated by class, culture, belief, gender, sexuality, age and ability, and globalised and digitalised culture. And it needs to be decided what role, if any, universities can play in relation to it. When Jose Ortega y Gasset wrote his book, Mission of the university, in 1944, he argued against specialization and for a university dedicated to the professions, stating as his first principle: 'University, in the strict sense is to mean that institution which teaches the ordinary person to be a cultured person and a good member of a profession'. He explains: 'Life cannot wait until the sciences may have explained the universe scientifically. We cannot put off living until we are ready. The most salient characteristic of life is its coerciveness: it is always urgent, "here and now" without any possibility of postponement. Life is fired at us point-blank. And culture, which is but its interpretation, cannot wait any more than can life itself' (Ortega y Gasset, 1944, p. 93-98) .
Since Ortega's Mission, such trends towards specialization in the university have intensified. Life continues to be fired at us point-blank. Universities are now highly sensitive globalised sites, participating in intensively networked research activity, frequently hosting international academics and conferences, and with highly developed internet communications, second only to military usage. Yet the apparent internationalism that surrounds these activities can often obscure their epistemological parochialism -the highly developed specialisms within science and increasingly the social sciences and arts, which leave the intelligent layperson bemused. Universities have to examine what can be commonly shared from their learned discourses and what is merely the incommunicable rattling of myriad discrete specialisms (see Barr and Steele, 2003) . But are they up to it? Are universities reformable or are they now too entangled in disciplinary divisions, market priorities and instrumentalism to serve as a useful model for the development of a globalised educated public? Universities have become increasingly specialized, fragmented and vocationalized, as Bill Readings and others have documented (see Readings, 1996) . Thinking has become an increasingly professionalized activity, as MacIntyre claims. The growing dominance of a 'technological understanding of being' (which Heidegger famously sees as being at the root of all of this and of the ways we relate to ourselves and to the world) reduces teachers and scholars to resources. Disciplines increasingly try to justify themselves in terms of their use value (Thomson, 2001, p. 250-1) .
CONCLUSION: A QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE
An educated public has to be able to deploy a common language which is subtle enough to decode specialist discourses but at the same time intelligible to those who have the intellectual curiosity but not the specialist knowledge. Arguably, it is only through dialogue between intellectuals/academics and wider publics that the ideas that matter develop, as Frank Furedi maintains. But a more generous rendering of the notion of an educated public is required, one which recognises the many-sided and criss-crossing nature of that dialogue, and one where the public is central rather than vice versa. The agenda for education is set outside universities and other formal educational establishments. This makes it imperative to look beyond universities, particularly to the various associations, groups and movements involved in civic life, some connected via the internet, which are producing knowledge rooted in projects. Some of these, such as Green Peace and the World Social Forum, actively challenge the dominant technological, reductive and instrumentalist presuppositions which guide much university research and which call for a radical critique of universities as institutions. Others, such as the developing arts and museums access movement, seek to change the rules governing access to cultural capital (see Chapter 3 below).
To return to the beginning of this chapter, Hal Foster is less quick than Frank Furedi to chastise academics themselves. In his view, the isolation of the intellectual might be due less to the 'solipsism of the scholar' than to the 'distraction of the public and the diminishment of the public sphere' (Foster, 2003, p. 36) . Rather than being part of the problem, the academy might be part of the solution, by serving as a public sphere in exile and by actively supporting the growth of new associations, rooted in projects, to which committed intellectuals and academics from different disciplines might contribute. Such a vision is in line with the Adam Smith encountered in this chapter. From this perspective, says Foster, the public intellectual might seem 'less moribund than reborn'. Thus far the Right has dominated the public imagination of art and academy: 'While the left talked about culture, the right practiced it. Its philosophers have… transformed the world, and it will take a great struggle to transform it otherwise'. The fundamental stake in art and academy, he continues, is 'the preservation, in an administered, affirmative culture, of spaces for critical debate and alternative vision' (Foster, 2001, p. xvii) .
In the chapters which follow I explore some of the spaces where such critical practice is taking shape and where the disposition to engage in public debate is by no means attenuated but rather being actively promoted and defined in new ways. I begin this exploration in the next chapter by looking at one area where such critical practice is evident. This is the field of arts and museums access, a growing movement internationally and one that is attracting followers and critics alike. Some of those latter-day critics, who tend to talk in terms of 'preserving standards', demonstrate that the old clerisy ideal is alive and kicking in our culture. Others who are less squeamish about widening access activities (and so-called 'dumbing down') have appealed to George Davie's philosophy to provide an alternative model of the relationship between art, intellectuals and public.
